In accordance with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ rotating chairmanship, Malaysia assumed the role for 2025, following Laos in 2024. For the nation, under its tenth Prime Minister, Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim—widely known as “PMX”—this chairmanship has been hailed as both a political and diplomatic opportunity.
Yet this year’s tenure differs materially from its predecessors. Amid escalating tensions arising from the US–China trade conflict and broader geopolitical instability, ASEAN risks being dismissed as a largely ceremonial bloc. Malaysia’s chairmanship, however, appears to have been more than mere ritual. Observers on both sides—optimists and skeptics alike—acknowledge tangible influence arising from this leadership, extending beyond symbolic success.
Domestically, opposition forces and casual critics of PMX have attempted to diminish these accomplishments, portraying them as inflated, exaggerated, or propagandistic. Such criticisms, however, obscure the material and strategic dimensions of ASEAN as a site of regional negotiation, economic coordination, and geopolitical positioning.
The question, therefore, is not rhetorical or theoretical: how successful is Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2025, and how much of the reported success reflects actual influence rather than political narrative? This remains the central issue, requiring an assessment grounded in material outcomes rather than ceremonial appearance.
Steering Away from ASEAN’s Toothlessness?
The ASEAN Summit has long been a ritual of appearances: heads of state converge in the chairing nation, dressed in traditional attire, exchanging smiles and engaging in the emblematic cross-handed handshake. Critics, however, note that this spectacle conceals a persistent weakness—the bloc’s inability to act decisively in pursuit of its stated ideals of regional peace and prosperity.
This limitation stems from ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention. While this principle facilitates formal cooperation among sovereign states, it simultaneously inhibits the bloc from addressing urgent and concrete crises. The situation in Myanmar illustrates this structural incapacity.
Anwar Ibrahim, in this context, represents a departure from the usual passivity of ASEAN leadership. From the outset of his premiership, he has been outspoken on international affairs, notably denouncing Israel’s actions in Gaza. Regionally, he has not shied away from criticising ASEAN’s failure to respond to the Tatmadaw’s repression in Myanmar, even proposing that the bloc consider measures including a review of Myanmar’s membership.
Ahead of the 2025 ASEAN Summit, Anwar pursued a proactive regional diplomacy. His social media presence—particularly on Instagram—served as a deliberate extension of his diplomatic style, pairing images of state visits with culturally resonant music. Yet in his engagement with Myanmar’s military leadership during a visit to Thailand, Anwar eschewed the performative gestures typical of ASEAN diplomacy. There were no smiling photographs, no symbolic accompaniments—only a written statement signalling a firm and uncompromising stance on the crisis.
A Panacea for the ASEAN Summit?
The 2025 ASEAN Summit convened in Kuala Lumpur from 26 to 28 October. The Malaysian government signalled its seriousness by implementing road closures, encouraging remote work, and aggressively promoting the event.
What distinguished this summit was not merely the breadth of invitations, but the stature of its attendees. President Donald J. Trump of the United States made his first official visit to the Asia-Pacific, greeted ceremonially by Anwar Ibrahim and a troupe of Malaysian dancers—a spectacle that drew criticism from those opposed to U.S. support for Israeli actions. China’s President Xi Jinping was invited but did not attend; Premier Li Qiang represented China. High-level delegations also arrived from the European Union, the BRICS bloc—including Russia and Brazil—and other Asia-Pacific states.
Trump’s presence produced tangible outcomes. First, the Kuala Lumpur Accords ended the Thai–Cambodian border conflict, bringing an “immediate, unconditional” ceasefire facilitated by Malaysia and formalised at the summit, with the United States as a signatory. Second, the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) between Malaysia and the U.S. was signed, marking the first bilateral trade agreement following the U.S.’s imposition of global tariffs. Reactions varied politically and industrially, yet the agreement constituted concrete material progress.
Another milestone was Timor-Leste’s formal admission to ASEAN, ending a decade-long struggle to join regional markets. Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão engaged the media with performative lightness, signalling both diplomatic confidence and strategic media awareness.
While not flawless, the 2025 ASEAN Summit under Malaysia’s chairmanship demonstrated measurable diplomatic and policy-based achievements, departing from the routine ceremonialism that has historically defined ASEAN gatherings. Even sceptics were compelled to acknowledge the summit’s impact.
Testing the Durability of Achievements
Following the summit, the durability of its achievements has been tested. The Kuala Lumpur Accords, intended to end hostilities between Cambodia and Thailand, faced persistent challenges, including repeated ceasefire violations and the Thai government’s reluctance to enforce compliance. Yet the agreement cannot be dismissed as a failure. It continues to serve as a reference point, invoked by advocates and by the Cambodian government in ongoing efforts to restore peace. Its continued relevance underscores Malaysia’s role as a facilitator in regional conflict resolution.
The Agreement on Reciprocal Trade presents a more ambiguous outcome. Its language, skewed toward U.S. interests, has prompted public scepticism over whether Malaysians benefit materially or whether the accord primarily advances American economic objectives. Even Malaysian officials, including Minister Tengku Zafrul, have publicly acknowledged that aspects of the agreement require renegotiation. While the United States remains a major export market, the ART has yet to fully address the concerns of local industry stakeholders.
In contrast, Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN stands as an unequivocal success. Malaysia, under Anwar Ibrahim, provided decisive support for the small nation’s inclusion, strengthening bilateral ties and ensuring its functional integration into the bloc. This marks the clearest and most concrete achievement of Malaysia’s 2025 chairmanship.
The Myanmar Question Remains Unabated
Ironically, despite recognition of the 2025 ASEAN Summit as a notably impactful gathering, its momentum was poorly leveraged in addressing the ongoing crisis in Myanmar. Malaysia has announced its role as an observer for Myanmar’s upcoming elections in December, reportedly with Russian support. Superficially, this may appear to be a gesture toward restoring democratic norms. Yet the summit itself went no further than reiterating that ASEAN would “continue to pursue efforts toward peace in Myanmar, guided by principles of humanity and inclusive dialogue,” as stated by the Prime Minister’s Office.
This represents a missed opportunity to convert international attention into tangible pressure on both the Tatmadaw and the National Unity Government (NUG) to accept a settlement, ideally under external guarantors. The December 2025 elections risk functioning less as democratic restoration and more as an attempt to reintegrate the Tatmadaw into international legitimacy, with Russian backing.
If ASEAN is serious about its stated ideals of peace and shared prosperity, attempts to normalise military dictatorship cannot be treated as routine political formalities. The Malaysian government must reconsider its passive endorsement of these elections and instead align policy with material and ethical imperatives that challenge authoritarian consolidation.
Demerits of ASEAN
It would be convenient, and indeed tempting, to dismiss Malaysia’s 2025 ASEAN Chairmanship as merely another instance of performative diplomacy. Yet such dismissal risks obscuring the structural realities that shape ASEAN and the material constraints under which it operates. The bloc’s limitations are not incidental, nor are they solely the product of complacent leadership. They arise from ASEAN’s foundational principle of non-intervention, which—though frequently criticised—serves as the linchpin for maintaining cooperation among diverse sovereign states.
This principle is not unique to ASEAN; international institutions everywhere grapple with the tension between sovereignty and collective action. In ASEAN’s case, the difficulty is compounded by immense political and economic diversity among its members. Divergent positions on issues such as the South China Sea and American trade tariffs make unified regional action not merely difficult but often impossible. Consequently, ASEAN agreements rely heavily on broad, mutually acceptable formulations. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) exemplifies this tendency.
Yet these limitations should not be conflated with total ineffectiveness. When member states pursue specific outcomes, bilateralism often becomes the mechanism of choice. The Agreement on Reciprocal Trade between Malaysia and the United States illustrates this dynamic. Unlike ASEAN multilateral accords, the ART contains concrete obligations and outcomes. Through such bilateral arrangements, actionable policy and material gains emerge.
An Exaggeration of Regional Glory?
From an impartial perspective, Malaysia’s 2025 ASEAN Chairmanship has been objectively consequential. Under Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia leveraged diplomatic skill and political initiative to facilitate tangible regional outcomes, most notably the resolution of the Thai–Cambodian conflict. Yet strategic opportunities were missed, particularly in failing to exert effective pressure on Myanmar’s military leadership.
A fair assessment must also recognise ASEAN’s structural limitations. Within these constraints, Malaysia appears to have exhausted its available instruments as Chair. By year’s end, public awareness of ASEAN’s role—and of Malaysia’s active stewardship—has noticeably increased, establishing a potential benchmark for future chairmanships.
Closing: Year End
As ASEAN approaches 2026, its future cannot be assessed through summit communiqués or diplomatic choreography alone, but through the material structures that delimit its capacity to act. Since its inception, ASEAN has functioned less as a vehicle for collective emancipation than as a mechanism for managing regional stability compatible with global capitalism.
Economic integration continues to deepen, yet its benefits remain concentrated among elites and transnational capital. Meanwhile, the crisis in Myanmar, widening inequality, and intensifying great-power rivalry expose the fragility of ASEAN’s model of stability without justice.
Any meaningful hope for ASEAN in 2026 lies not in cosmetic reform, but in recognising that regional crises are structural rather than episodic. Without a shift from the logic of markets to the logic of social need, ASEAN risks persisting as a stable, courteous, and increasingly irrelevant institution.
Author’s Note
The writer is a graduate student at USM’s School of Social Sciences, specialising in Comparative Politics, Historical Political Economy, and Chinese Politics. He previously worked as a contributing researcher at political institutes and holds a Bachelor of Social Science (Hons) in Political Science and Philosophy from Universiti Sains Malaysia.
**The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of Naratif Online or any affiliated parties.
